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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of the Jerome County District Court’s Memorandum Decision and

Order issued on September 26, 2018 and the Amended Judgment issued on November 30, 2018.
Clerk’s Record (“R.”); R. 693, 763. Respondents Thomas and Deanna Jensen (“Jensens”)
obstructed the natural flow of surface water from an upstream area of 282 acres, including from
Appellant Lora K. Roberts’ (“Roberts”) property, causing flooding in 2017. Roberts filed suit
but the court granted the Jensens’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed her complaint
with prejudice. Roberts submits the district court erred and respectfully requests this Court to
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
II.

Course of Proceedings
Roberts filed a complaint in January 2018 alleging nuisance and trespass claims, seeking

damages and injunctive relief. R. 11. The Jensens answered and filed a counterclaim in March
2018. R. 19. Thereafter Roberts filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting materials.
R. 31-50. The Jensens filed a motion to strike, a motion to dismiss, and a motion to continue the
proceedings. R. 67, 82, 101. The Jensens then amended their answer and counterclaim. R. 365.
Roberts replied to the counterclaim and filed an amended complaint. R. 377, 387.
Roberts filed a new motion for summary judgment and supporting materials on June 22,
2018. R. 394-415. The Jensens filed a second amended answer and counterclaim to which
Roberts replied. R. 416, 429. The Jensens also filed a motion for summary judgment and
supporting materials on July 30, 2018. R. 432-528. Roberts responded and filed the
supplemental affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway, Jr. which included his expert report entitled
“Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic Modeling on Sunnyside Acres Subdivision.” R. 529-543,
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626. The Jensens filed a new motion to dismiss. R. 578. After further response and reply
briefing, the district court heard the motions on August 27, 2018.
The court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on September 26, 2018. R. 693.
The court denied Roberts’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed her amended complaint
with prejudice. R. 713. The court granted the Jensens’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed their counterclaim as moot. See id. The court entered a final judgment. R. 715.
Roberts moved to reconsider the decision. R. 717. The district court denied Roberts’ motion for
reconsideration and entered an amended judgment on November 30, 2018. R. 752, 763. The
court also denied Jensens’ request for attorney fees. R. 760. Roberts filed a timely notice of
appeal to this Court on January 7, 2019. R. 767. This Court dismissed the Jensens’ untimely
cross appeal on the attorneys fees issue.
III.

Statement of Facts
The Sunnyside Acres Subdivision was platted in Jerome County in 1978. R. 17, 694.

Prior to that time the property was all farmed where water naturally drained to a low point near
what is now Sunnyside Drive. R. 410-11. Water flowed southwesterly through the property
under or across the 500 S. Road, and then across another farm to 100 W. where it would
eventually drain into the Snake River Canyon. See id. This course of drainage was confirmed
by the existence of a “waste ditch” that followed this contour for decades. R. 17, 256, 414. The
total basin drained in this area is approximately 282 acres. R. 538.
Roberts purchased her property, Lot 5 in Block 1 (46 Sunnyside Dr.), in 2001, more than
20 years after the development of the subdivision. R. 41, 694. Prior owners had obliterated the
portion of the waste ditch on her property. R. 41. Despite the prior removal of the ditch, surface
water continued to flow southwesterly across Roberts’ property both under and across Sunnyside
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Drive to the portion of the ditch that still remained on Lot 35. R. 41, 65, 407-08. Roberts
testified that two events of melting snow and rainfall caused limited flooding on her property
prior to 2010. R. 41. During those events, the water would flow and overtop Sunnyside Drive
and then follow the natural drainage to and through the ditch crossing Lot 35. R. 41, 49, 65, 408.
The water crossing the road was approximately four (4) inches in depth. R. 41, 49, 65. Flood
water from these events never reached Roberts’ home, barn, or corrals as it was able to
ultimately drain over the road and through the culvert into the ditch across Lot 35. R. 12, 41.
Thomas and Deanna Jensen acquired their property, Lot 35 Block 2 (51 Sunnyside Dr.) in
May 2010. R. 150, 205. The waste ditch existed at the time they acquired the property. R. 150,
205, 259. The Jensens acknowledged that water would naturally flow from the Roberts’ property
to and through the ditch that crossed their property. R. 152-53 (“13. The Waste Ditch flowed
through the Jensen Property, from the Northeast and generally ran to the South-Southwest. . . .
17. During the years that I have lived at the Jensen Property, the portion of the Waste Ditch
located on the Jensen Property was only flowing with water in rare instances of a large storm or
rapid snow melt.”); R. 205-07.

Waste Ditch Crossing
Jensen Property until

2013

R. 259 (2009 aerial image zoomed in); see also, R. 44 (2011 aerial image showing ditch).
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In 2013 Roberts observed dirt piles on the Jensen property next to the ditch and advised
the Jensens that filling it in would block the natural flow of surface water that flowed through her
property. R. 41. The Jensens ignored this advice and proceeded to fill in the ditch that year. R.
156 (“Thomas and I filled in the portion of the Waste Ditch located on the Jensen Property,
placing materials in the course of the Waste Ditch to level it off with the surrounding land.”); R.
695 (“The Jensens’ admit that they filled in the ditch on their property with fill or soil in 2013”).
Filling in the ditch changed the contour and topography of the Jensens’ property in that
location. Compare R. 44, 45, and 46; see also, R. 158-59, 173, 190-91. A professional survey
showed the high point of the filled in ditch to be approximately three (3) feet higher than the
bottom outlet of the culvert on the Jensens’ property. R. 539, 542, 548 (“At this point the bottom
of the swale created by the fill is 3.0 feet higher than the invert of the Sunnyside Drive culvert at
its outlet”).

R. 191 (picture showing Jensen property looking southwest after ditch filled in).
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R. 191 (picture showing Jensen property looking northeast toward Sunnyside Drive after ditch
filled in, the outline of the former ditch is still visible).
In February 2017 Roberts’ property flooded from melting snow and precipitation. R. 13,
41, 57-63, 695. Unlike prior flooding events where water flowed through the ditch across the
Jensens’ property, this time water backed up into Roberts’ crawl space as well as into her barn
and corrals. R. 42, 58, 60, 62. The depth of the water crossing the road increased to at least
eighteen (18) inches and spread for a distance of two hundred (200) feet. See id., R. 182.
With the ditch filled in, flood water could no longer drain and flow across the Jensens’
property as it had in the past. R. 41. Instead, water ponded on the Roberts property for almost
two weeks, damaging her home and her horses’ feed. R. 42. The increased flooding also forced
Roberts to remove her horses from the property. See id. The flooding interfered with Roberts’
enjoyment and use of her property. Consequently, Roberts filed the present action seeking relief
from the Jensens’ interference with the natural servitude.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
Roberts presents the following issues on appeal:
1.
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by failing to
apply Idaho’s well-established natural servitude doctrine.
2.
Whether the District Court erred by refusing to consider relevant
expert testimony set forth in the affidavits of Dr. Charles G. Brockway.
3.
Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Robert’s nuisance
claim as a matter of law.
4.
Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Robert’s trespass
claim as a matter of law.
5.
Whether the District Court erred in granting Jensens’ summary
judgment motion and dismissing Roberts’ amended complaint with prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(a); City of Pocatello v.
State of Idaho (In re SRBA), 145 Idaho 497, 500, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2008). When this Court
reviews a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment it employs the same standard
properly employed by the district court when originally ruling on the motion. Cherry v. Coregis
Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 882, 884, 204 P.3d 522, 524 (2009) (citing Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v.
Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 431, 987 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1999)).
This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793,
134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). Moreover, filing of cross motions does not in itself establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. See First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131
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Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). Instead, each party’s motion is evaluated on its own
merits. Petrus Family Trust v. Kirk, 163 Idaho 490, 494, 415 P.3d 358, 362 (2018).
The nonmoving party cannot rest upon mere speculation and must submit more than just
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment.
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008). A nonmoving party
must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit, or otherwise, that contradicts the evidence
submitted by the moving party and establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact.
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007) (citations omitted).
Admissibility of evidence within affidavits in support or in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment is a threshold question to be addressed before a court can determine the
outcome of the summary judgment motion. See Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d
1165, 1169 (1999). The district court's decision whether to admit expert testimony is reviewed
by an appellate court under the abuse of discretion standard. See Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247,
250, 409 P.3d 827, 830 (2018).
As explained below, the district court wrongly granted the Jensens’ motion for summary
judgment in light of the existing natural servitude and impacts resulting from their actions in
2013. Further, the court abused its discretion in excluding relevant expert testimony offered by
Roberts in opposition to the Jensens’ motion. This Court should reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
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ARGUMENT
Aqua currit, et debet currere, ut solebat ex jure naturae. Translated from Latin, “Water
runs and ought to run, as it runs from the law of nature.” This phrase summarizes the central
issue in this case, that is “how does Idaho law regulate surface water flowing from high to low
ground?” Fortunately, decades of jurisprudence provide the certainty that lower lands must
accept the servitude of surface water flowing from higher lands.
The district court erred in applying well-established precedent to the facts in this case.
Although prior land development, the prior “waste ditch” easement, and the analysis of the “civil
law” rule exception may have all contributed to the court’s confusion, the salient legal principle
of a natural servitude was wrongly decided.
As discussed in detail below, the actions of a lower landowner cannot be ignored when
those actions obstruct the flow of water and damage an up-gradient landowner’s property. The
Jensens’ wrongful actions in 2013 interfered with Roberts’ natural servitude damaging her
property. See Ex. A (I.A.R. 35(g) exhibit). Consequently, Roberts has valid nuisance and
trespass claims that should be allowed to proceed to trial.
Moreover, the court erroneously refused to consider relevant expert testimony on this
issue. Whereas Roberts’ expert Dr. Brockway offered valid scientific analysis showing the
consequences of the Jensens’ actions on the Roberts property, the district court wrongly excluded
the same as speculative. The court’s abuse of discretion should therefore be reversed. In sum,
Roberts respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s decision and remand for
further proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
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I.

The District Court Failed to Apply Idaho’s Well-Established “Civil Law”
Natural Servitude Rule.
A.

Idaho’s “Civil Law” Rule and Exception.

Idaho follows the “civil law” rule of surface waters. See Lemhi County v. Moulton, 163
Idaho 404, 414 P.3d 223 (2018); Smith v. King Creek Grazing Ass’n., 105 Idaho 644, 646, 671
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Ct. App. 1983). Judge Burnett succinctly described the rule, and its exception,
as follows:
Our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine known as the “civil law” rule
of surface waters. Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974).
This rule, broadly stated, is that a property owner may not so interfere with the
natural flow of surface waters as to cause an invasion of a neighboring owner’s
interest in the use and enjoyment of his land. The rule recognizes a servitude for
natural drainage of surface water. An owner of lower property must accept the
burden of surface water which naturally drains upon his land. Conversely, the
owner of higher property cannot increase this burden by changing the natural
system of drainage. Annot., Modern Status of Rules Governing Interference With
Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193, 1207 (1979).
***
Dayley demonstrates that the “civil law” rule may apply differently to
surface water drainage within a natural watercourse than to drainage outside such
a watercourse. If a natural watercourse exists, the upper landowner may alter the
natural flow so long as it remains within the watercourse. This exception to the
“civil law” rule has been acknowledged in many other “civil law” jurisdictions.
[citations omitted].
Smith, 105 Idaho at 646, 671 P.2d at 1109.
Idaho’s natural servitude law has two parts: 1) the rule; and 2) the exception. The rule
provides that a lower landowner must accept the natural flow of surface water from higher or upgradient lands. The exception allows the upper landowner to alter that flow (i.e. collect,
concentrate, and/or augment it), but only if the water is carried across the lower property within
the confines of a natural watercourse. 1 The exception only applies to alterations by the upper

1

A “natural watercourse” is “a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides or banks, and
discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. The flow of water need not be constant, but must be
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landowner, not to the actions by the lower landowner, in this case the Jensens. The “civil law”
rule “is anchored by philosophical and pragmatic values” and the laws of nature as there can be
no dispute that draining water must flow downhill. See Hon. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., Surface
Water and Nuisance Law: A Proposed Synthesis, 20 Idaho L. Rev. 185, 193 (1984).
With respect to the natural servitude rule and diffused surface water, having a natural
watercourse is not a necessary element. See Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393
(1945). Judge Burnett described the holding in Loosli as follows:
In Loosli v. Heseman, the Supreme Court expressly approved the “civil
law” rule. The court held that an upper landowner had an easement of drainage
across the land of a lower proprietor, to the extent of water naturally flowing from
the higher ground to the lower tract. However, this servitude could not be
augmented by acts of the upper landowner. Notably, the surface water at issue in
Loosli had flowed from the upper ground to the lower tract not through an
established watercourse, but through an irregular swale. Thus, by adopting the
“civil law” rule and applying it to surface water outside a watercourse, the
Supreme Court broadened the rule of noninterference earlier applied to owners of
riparian lands along watercourses.
Burnett, Jr., 20 Idaho L. Rev. at 189 (emphasis added).
Notably, “diffused surface water” has been defined as “water that is on or at the surface
without being in a defined body of water.” Waters & Water Rights, § 10.03(a), p. 10-55 (2014).
Further, the “chief characteristic of [diffused] surface water is its inability to maintain its identity
and existence as a water body . . . While the flowage patterns for diffused surface water will
naturally tend to follow certain settled patterns, these paths lack beds, banks, beaches, or shores
which typify defined waterbodies.” Id.

more than mere surface drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes; there must be substantial indications of the
existence of a stream, which is ordinarily a moving body of water.” See Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16
Idaho 484, 488, 101 P. 1059, 1061 (1909); see also, Moulton, 414 P.3d at 233.
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Idaho cases recognize diffused surface water as differentiated from waters of natural
watercourses or lakes. See King v. Chamberlin, 20 Idaho 504, 509-13, 118 P. 1099, 1100-1102
(1911); Washington County Irr. Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 389, 43 P.2d 943, 946 (1935).
Water artificially impounded on private land, collected from rain and melting snow, has been
held to be not public water of the State subject to general appropriation. See id.
The “civil law” rule has been accepted and applied by Idaho courts for decades. See
Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945); Harper v. Johannesen, 84 Idaho 279,
371 P.2d 842 (1962); Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974); Smith v.
King Creek Grazing Ass’n., 105 Idaho 644, 671 P.2d 1107 (Ct. App. 1983); Lemhi County v.
Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 414 P.3d 226 (2018). Accordingly, any person with low lying land
must accept the fact that his or her land may be burdened with the servitude of natural drainage
from up-gradient lands.
B.

The Common Enemy Rule.

Unlike the “civil law” rule, the “common enemy” rule allows a landowner to protect his
or her property from flowing water regardless of the effect on other properties. This rule has
been described as follows:
The common enemy rule is one of the original approaches to disputes involving
diffused surface water and has been referred to as the “common law rule.” As
the name implies, this approach treats diffused surface water as the enemy
common to all landowners. Consequently, property owners can take whatever
steps they deem necessary to fight against that common enemy. Further, a
landowner is not liable for any damage that his or her fight against diffused
surface water causes to neighboring property. In turn, the neighboring property
owner has every right to cast the diffused surface water back upon the first
landowner.
William P. Elliott II, Diffused Surface Water in Wyoming: Ascertaining Property Owners’ Rights
and Settling Disputes, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 409, 411 (2011).
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Judge Burnett similarly explained the rule in his seminal Idaho Law Review article
Surface Water and Nuisance Law: A Proposed Synthesis:
At one end of the spectrum is the “common enemy” rule which, in its pure form,
treats surface water as a hazard common to all landowners. This rule accords to
each owner an unqualified right to undertake, upon his own property, to fend off
surface waters as he sees fit, without liability for the consequences to other
landowners. The other landowners have a correlative right to protect themselves
as best they can.
Burnett, Jr., 20 Idaho L. Rev. at 187-88.
Idaho does not follow the “common enemy” rule. See Dayley, 96 Idaho at 103, 524 P.2d
at 1075 (“This court adheres to the civil law rule (as opposed to the common enemy rule. 59
A.L.R.2d 421 (1958)) ”). 2 As explained below, the district court misapplied Idaho’s “civil law”
rule for a natural servitude and effectively created a situation that leaves Roberts with no remedy
but to fight future flood water as a “common enemy.” Since Idaho has rejected the “common
enemy” rule, this Court should reverse.
C.

The District Court’s Decision.

The district court properly cited and acknowledged binding precedent regarding natural
servitude law in Idaho. R. 704-05. However, the court erroneously conflated and misapplied the
“civil law” rule and exception by concluding no “natural watercourse” prevented the existence of
a natural servitude between the Roberts and Jensen properties. In essence, the court found the
mere existence of a county road and culvert cut off any natural servitude. The court made this
finding despite the fact water had naturally drained and flowed to and through the Jensen
property for decades. R. 41, 49, 65, 408. Further, the court ignored the fact that the ditch

2

Coincidentally, the Jensens advanced arguments in favor of the “common enemy” rule before the district court. R.
433 (“the Jensens could hypothetically construct a crystalline wall around the Jensen Property to prevent anything
(including water) from entering the Jensen Property without liability to Roberts for water that remained on the
Roberts Property.”). The argument has no merit under Idaho law and should be rejected.
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crossing the Jensens’ property had naturally drained surface water from an area of 282 acres,
including the Roberts property, since at least 2001. R. 41, 152-53, 538.
The court’s errors apparently resulted in part due to the Jensens’ misinterpretation of
Idaho law and their argument that a “natural watercourse” is a required element of a natural
servitude. R. 447, 449-51, 606 (alleging a natural servitude can only exist where water drains
through a natural watercourse). Since a natural watercourse is not a predicate for the existence
of a natural servitude for surface water between two properties, this Court should correct the
district court’s errors and reverse accordingly.
The district court concluded the following with respect to a “natural servitude”:
The natural drainage of the Roberts property has been altered by Sunnyside Drive
and the failure to maintain the culvert. Sunnyside Drive is an obstruction to the
natural drainage of water from the Roberts property which has resulted in the
accumulation of water on the Roberts’ property. Further, the water discharged by
the culvert, which is an artificial structure, is not discharged into a watercourse
and originally was discharged into a waste ditch which is an artificial channel.
Therefore, the doctrine of natural servitude does not apply to this case.
R. 707.
The district court found that the development of the county road over the properties
essentially cut off the natural servitude because water used to flow through a “waste ditch” not a
“natural watercourse.” The court made several errors in its analysis.
First, Roberts did not alter her property in any way to “accumulate or concentrate” the
surface water that flowed naturally across her property. The property was subdivided in 1978.
While irrigation wastewater and natural surface water used to drain through the properties before
its development, eventually just diffused surface water drained through after the subdivision
filled out and portions of the ditch were removed. R. 41, 49, 65, 408. The portion of the ditch
crossing the Roberts property had been removed when she purchased it in 2001. Even without
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the ditch, water would still naturally flow across her property both through the culvert and over
Sunnyside Drive, eventually through the ditch across the Jensen property. R. 41. This condition
of unobstructed surface water drainage existed from 2001 until 2013.
On other hand, the Jensens acquired their property in 2010 with the ditch still existing on
their property. R. 44. The Jensens specifically admitted surface water flowed through the ditch
on their property after they acquired it in 2010. R. 153 (“the portion of the Waste Ditch located
on the Jensen Property was only flowing with water in rare instances of a large storm or rapid
snow melt.”). Accordingly, a natural servitude existed to drain surface water flowing through
the higher Roberts property both under and over Sunnyside Drive through the lower Jensens’
property (which included the existing ditch feature).
Second, Roberts did not install the county road or the culvert. Water that naturally flows
through the Roberts property is not diverted, concentrated, or directed by Roberts in any manner.
To the contrary, flood waters naturally flowed both under and over Sunnyside Drive across the
Jensen property since Roberts acquired her property in 2001. R. 41, 49, 65, 408, 707. Stated
another way, the “civil law” rule exception was not at issue. Compare Teeter v. Nampa &
Meridian Irr. Dist., 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8, 9 (1911); Dayley, 96 Idaho at 103-04, 524 P.2d at
1075-76. The Jensens acquired their property in 2010 subject to these conditions, including the
fact that water would drain off southwesterly from an area of 282 acres (including the Roberts
property) to and through the then existing waste ditch on their property. See Ex. B.
Stated another way, the Jensens acquired their land burdened with this servitude to accept
surface water that flowed to and through their property. Thus, the critical issue in this case is the
actions taken by the Jensens in 2013 and how those actions interfered with and obstructed the
natural servitude that existed for decades.
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It is also undisputed the Jensens filled in the ditch in the summer of 2013. R. 156, 695.
Those actions blocked the natural flow of water causing subsequent damage to Roberts. R. 5463; 182-83. Notably, the elevation of the filled in ditch’s high point on the Jensen property is
now approximately three (3) feet higher than the culvert outlet under Sunnyside Drive. R. 539,
542, 548; Ex. A. The change in topography altered the flow pattern, flooding Roberts’ property.
Yet, the court ignored this fact and claimed the road was a “substantial factor in the reduction of
the flow of water” from the Roberts property to the Jensens property. 3 R. 756. The district court
made this finding despite acknowledging there was no evidence that the parties had measured the
flow of water through the culvert. R. 707.
Third, the culvert does not “discharge” water onto the Jensen property. The culvert
allows the passage of water, albeit not all, underneath the road from higher to lower ground. The
culvert is not a source of artificially diverted water or under the control of Roberts in any way to
accumulate and discharge it in an unnatural condition. Consequently, the facts here are not like
the cases where water was intentionally diverted and released at a different location, or
augmented, to the detriment of the lower landowner. See Teeter, 114 P. at 9 (“The appellant
should not be allowed to collect the entire volume of water and turn it out through one spillway,
and thereby increase the burden, dangers, and damages such waters will cause to the
respondent’s lands”); Dayley, 96 Idaho at 103-04, 524 P.2d at 1075-76 (“Upon the expansion of

3

The court further erroneously concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that the [Jensen’s] obstructed the flow of the
water where the culvert enters their property.” R. 756. The Jensens admitted to filling in the ditch in 2013. R. 156,
695. Further, Ms. Jensen’s photographs clearly show the fill of dirt, rocks, and bricks blocking the culvert on their
side of Sunnyside Drive. R. 173. The land survey also shows the difference in elevation between the area of the
filled in ditch and the culvert as well. R. 539, 542, 548. As such, the district court erred in its finding. At a
minimum the district court wrongly granted summary judgment in light of this disputed issue of fact. See American
Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that summary judgment is
improperly granted where any genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved.”); Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries,
Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994) (“the district court may not weigh controverted facts and
evidence in resolving a summary judgment motion.”).
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the city into this new area the ability of the land to absorb this surface water was lost; and the
city to remove the surface water constructed the curbs, gutters and storm drain sewers,
effectively concentrating into a small area the accumulated surface water”); Smith, 105 Idaho at
647, 671 P.2d at 1110 (“King Creek may not so change the flow as to increase this burden. King
Creek has, in fact, augmented the flow by developing the spring.”). 4
While Roberts acknowledges that water would flow both under and over Sunnyside Drive
prior to 2013, and that the existence of the road and culvert did cause limited flooding on her
property, the district court erroneously believed this fact completely absolved the Jensens the
established natural servitude burden. This is not the law since prior precedent shows that the
existence of a “man-made” feature, in this case a county road, does not cut off a natural
servitude.
Notably, in Teeter, the man-made Ridenbaugh Canal did not sever the natural servitude
that existed on the respondent’s property. Similar to the facts in this case, the man-made feature
bisected the natural servitude that existed between the properties:
The [appellant] is the owner of what is commonly known as the Ridenbaugh
Canal. This canal runs along and by the respondent’s lands on the east side
thereof; the canal being above the lands on the upper or higher lands. In this
locality the canal crosses a series of draws or natural drainage basins, the principal
ones of which are designated as Five-Mile, Seven-Mile, Eight-Mile, and Ten-Mile
creeks. It appears that in the winter and early spring, from January to March,
more or less flood water comes down these draws from the higher lands and flows
over and cross [respondent’s] land. . . . The [appellant] company conceived the
idea of gathering the waters in the canal by having the banks on the lower side
higher than those on the upper side, and letting it all out at one place by means of
a spillway, which it constructed, 16 feet wide. . . . The natural flood waters
which gather in these draws or basins must necessarily flow down over
respondent’s land. It is clearly shown that the canal has not sufficient capacity to
carry off these waters. The respondent, on the other hand, has a right to insist that

4

The Court in Smith acknowledged the “civil law” rule but ultimately found that the exception applied since the
discharge of the increased spring flow would flow into a natural watercourse. See 105 Idaho at 649, 671 P.2d at
1112.
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they come down in their natural channels, or in such manner as not to augment the
dangers and damages which they would ordinarily entail upon respondent’s land.
Teeter, 114 P. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
Just as the respondent had no right to block surface water that flowed into and eventually
through the man-made canal in Teeter, the same principle applies to the Jensens and the county
road in this case. Similarly, just as the irrigation district could not accumulate and discharge the
flood waters through a single spillway across respondent’s property in Teeter, Roberts cannot
accumulate and spill accumulated water in a concentrated manner across the Jensen property.
Still, like the canal in Teeter, the fact Sunnyside Drive exists does not sever the “natural
servitude” between the Roberts and Jensen properties. Indeed, the road did not stop natural
surface water from continuing to flow to and through the Jensen property as it had for decades.
A similar situation arose in Moulton where a county road divided two parcels and the
Supreme Court affirmed the existence of a natural servitude through the Hartvigson Draw which
eventually crossed the road. Moulton, 414 P.3d at 228-229, 232. Although the drainage at issue
qualified as a “natural watercourse” so as to allow the respondent to collect and release
“irrigation water, wastewater, and other accumulated diverted water” pursuant to the “civil law”
rule exception, the Court did not find that the road cut off the natural servitude in any way. See
id. at 233. In other words, although a county road was constructed, the Court did not eliminate
the existing natural servitude between the two ranches. See id. at 229 (“The water that flows
through this draw runs under the Lemhi County Backroad through one of two culverts, across the
Hartvigson Ranch, and into a drainage that feeds into the Lemhi River. . . the district court
entered a judgment that the Hartvigson Ranch allow drainage of natural surface water in the
amount of 3.25 cfs through the culverts across its lands, ‘subject to weather events or other
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natural conditions that may result in larger amounts.’”) (emphasis added). The same principle
applies to the facts in this case.
In sum, the district court failed to properly apply the “civil law” rule that governs natural
servitudes. Idaho law prohibited the Jensens from interfering with the established “natural
servitude” that burdened their property. See Dayley, 96 Idaho at 103, 524 P.2d at 1075 (“the
lower owner must accept the ‘surface’ water which naturally drains onto his land.”); Moulton,
414 P.3d at 229. Since surface water flowed from an area of 282 acres, including the Roberts
property, to and through the Jensen property for decades, the law burdened the Jensens’ property
to continue to accept the drainage water without obstruction. The district court misapplied wellestablished precedent on this issue therefore this Court should reverse.
II.

The District Court Erroneously Excluded Dr. Brockway’s Expert Testimony
Concerning the Effect of the Jensens’ Interference with the Natural Servitude that
Damaged the Roberts Property.
The district court used its erroneous natural servitude conclusion as a basis to justify

excluding the expert opinion of Dr. Brockway. It appears the court excluded the testimony based
upon the abandonment of a ditch easement and the partial obstruction of the culvert connecting
the Roberts and Jensen properties. In essence, the court excluded the expert testimony due to its
ruling on summary judgment rather than evaluating the affidavit in its review of the existing
servitude and damages the Jensens caused to the Roberts property.
Whereas Dr. Brockway’s expert report provided relevant information as to the drainage
of the area in question, a detailed topographic survey, and evaluation of the flooding that
occurred in 2017, the court summarily concluded it would “not assist the trier of fact.” R. 703.
Instead, the court found the culvert under Sunnyside Drive was “unable to adequately convey
water off the Roberts’ property,” and that fact apparently justified excluding the expert’s opinion
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altogether. Id. The district court’s reasoning is flawed and does not satisfy the relevance test
and abuse of discretion standard required under Idaho law.
Moreover, whereas it was undisputed that surface water would flow over Sunnyside
Drive prior to 2013, the court failed to consider relevant evidence concerning changes to the
Jensen property in 2013, and the consequences resulting from those actions when the Roberts’
property flooded in 2017. As such an expert’s opinion as to causation, when considered in light
of the drainage hydrology, topography, and other factors is certainly relevant to that question.
Since the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Brockway’s expert opinion this
Court should reverse.
A. The Standard of Admissibility of Dr. Brockway’s Expert Opinion.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise. See I.R.E. 702. To determine whether expert testimony is admissible, the district
court must consider two factors. First, to give expert opinion testimony, a witness must be
qualified as an expert on the matter at hand. See id. Whether a witness is sufficiently qualified as
an expert is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. See Sidwell v. William Prym,
Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 81, 730 P.2d 996, 1001 (1986). Here, neither the Jensens nor the court
disputed that Dr. Brockway is qualified as an expert witness on matters of hydrology. R. 52.
Next, the district court's decision whether to admit expert testimony is reviewed by an
appellate court under the abuse of discretion standard. See Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 250,
409 P.3d 827, 830 (2018). 5 Here, the district court abused its discretion by granting the Jensens’

5

When reviewing a trial court's ruling under the abuse of discretion standard a reviewing court inquires: (1) whether
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
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summary judgment motion without fully addressing the admissibility of Dr. Brockway’s expert
opinion pursuant to I.R.E. 702 and applicable case law. As such, this Court should reverse and
remand for further consideration.
Admissibility of evidence within depositions and affidavits in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be addressed before a court can
determine the outcome of the summary judgment motion. See Bromley, 132 Idaho at 811, 979
P.2d at 1169. In this case the district court committed error by reversing the order of the analysis
and ruling as a matter of law without first considering relevant expert testimony offered in
opposition to the Jensens’ motion.
The test for admissibility of expert testimony is Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. See State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
I.R.E. 702.
Although this Court has not explicitly adopted the Daubert standards, they provide the
best conceptual framework for addressing expert admissibility under I.RE. 702 which is nearly
identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,
838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007). Thus, Daubert provides the outer boundary for a district
court’s discretion.
The Daubert regime contemplates that trial judges will perform a gatekeeping function,
determining “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying [proffered expert] testimony is

boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143
Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007).
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scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
Pertinent to the precise issue presented in this appeal, there is an abundance of federal
case law addressing the interplay between Rule 702 and summary judgment. A thorough
summation of this interplay was provided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Cortes-Irizarry
v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997). Notably, at the junction
where Daubert intersects with summary judgment practice, courts must be cautious not to
exclude scientific evidence without affording the proponent of the evidence adequate opportunity
to defend its admissibility. See id. Given the complex factual inquiry required
by Daubert, courts should be cautious in all but the most clear-cut cases to gauge the reliability
of expert proof on a truncated record. See id. Because the summary judgment process does not
conform well to the discipline that Daubert imposes, “the Daubert regime should be employed
only with great care and circumspection at the summary judgment stage." Corporacion Insular
De Seguros, 111 F.3d at 188.
A trial setting provides the best operating environment for the “triage”
which Daubert demands. See id. Consistent with the First Circuit’s caution, the Idaho Supreme
Court has specifically found that if information within a supplemental affidavit raises genuine
issues of material fact as to causation, summary judgment should be denied. State v.
Rubbermaid Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 359, 924 P.2d 615, 621 (1996).
In this case the district court failed to address the legal standards for an evidentiary
hearing at the summary judgment stage. The court erroneously disregarded relevant evidence
provided by Dr. Brockway regarding surveyed land elevations, including the location where the
Jensens filled in the ditch, and the causation of flooding to Roberts’ property. R. 535-58. The
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fact that the Jensens’ actions increased the flooding of Roberts’ property in 2017 alone should
have caused the court to deny summary judgment. See Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho at 359, 924
P.2d at 621. In addition, by completely overlooking the relevant information presented by Dr.
Brockway, the district court did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion or act
consistently with applicable Daubert legal standards. Thus, the district court’s decision to strike
Dr. Brockway’s relevant expert testimony should be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
B. The District Court Did Not Reach its Decision by an Exercise of Reason in
Finding Dr. Brockway’s Testimony Speculative and Inadmissible.
Once the witness is qualified as an expert, the trial court must determine whether
the expert's opinion testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. See
I.R.E. 702; Sidwell, 112 Idaho at 81, 730 P.2d at 1001. The test for admissibility of expert
testimony is Rule 702. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998).
This condition goes primarily to relevance. State v. Caliz-Bautista, 162 Idaho 833, 835,
405 P.3d 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2017) discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). One aspect of relevancy is whether the expert testimony
proffered is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case such that the testimony will aid the finder of
fact in resolving a factual dispute. See id. If an expert's opinion is speculative or unsubstantiated
by facts in the record it is unhelpful to valid fact finding. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co.
of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 316, 193 P.3d 858, 863 (2008). However, if
the expert's testimony is competent and relevant it should be admitted; and the weight given to
the testimony is left to the trier of fact. State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90
(Ct. App. 1987).
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Roberts submitted the supplemental affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway Jr. in
opposition to the Jensens’ summary judgment motion. 6 R. 535-42. Dr. Brockway made
scientific findings and offered his expert opinion that the Jensens’ action of filling the drainage
ditch which had served as the point of natural servitude drainage for Roberts’ property caused
additional water to backup and flood the Roberts’ property:
Prior to about 2013, the drainage ditch through the Jensen property (Lot 35, Block
2) was a defined ditch. Since then the ditch has been filled, creating a shallow
swale rather than a defined ditch. Based on the survey, the estimated depth of fill
varies from zero to at least 2.0 feet compared to the estimated ditch grade prior to
fill. The high point of the fill occurs about midway between the north and south
lines of the Jensen property at cross section 18 on Figure 2. At this point the
bottom of the swale created by the fill is 3.0 feet higher than the invert of the
Sunnyside Drive culvert at its outlet and 2.5 higher than the invert of the original
ditch at that same point.
***
Regardless of the magnitude of the runoff flow, once water has ponded, it cannot
drain because the fill on the Jensen property acts as a dam. The water elevation
must rise above elevation 3586.7 feet before any southward flow can occur. If the
fill had not been placed, water would drain to elevation 3585.2 feet after runoff
ceased and standing water would not persist on the Roberts property.
Because of the fill placed in the ditch on the Jensen property, water accumulating
on the Roberts property can now only dissipate by infiltrating into the soil over
many days. This is consistent with the observed dissipation of the ponded water
after the 2017 event.
R. 539, 541.
Dr. Brockway provided an important figure based upon the land survey that showed the
effect of the Jensens’ actions upon the Roberts’ property when flooding occurs:

6

Dr. Brockway relied upon a land survey performed by Douglas Schwarz of EHM Engineers, Inc. R. 536, 544-58.
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R. 542.
The above figure shows how the higher gradient resulting from the fill increased the
water surface and flooding of the Roberts’ property. See id. Notably, the high point of fill on the
Jensen property is now approximately three (3) feet higher than the bottom outlet of the culvert
under Sunnyside Drive. See id.; see also, Ex. A. This obstruction forces the water to back up
and spread out across the Roberts property causing increased flooding.
Despite this evidence, the district court excluded Brockway’s expert testimony as
speculative, ultimately granting summary judgment in favor of the Jensens. R. 703, 713. The
district court mischaracterized the nature of the question before it by framing the issue as one
which would require analysis regarding the capacity of the culvert, which Dr. Brockway did not
address. 7 Again, the capacity of the culvert to take all flood water was not the issue on summary
judgment, since periodic flooding over Sunnyside Drive had occurred prior to 2013. R. 41.
Instead, the question before the court was the impact of the Jensens’ actions and whether filling

77

For purposes of his analysis Dr. Brockway applied an assumption that the culvert was 50% blocked, consistent
with the facts presented to the court. R. 540, 703. Dr. Brockway’s analysis evaluated the actual conditions that the
parties had experienced since at least 2013 when the Jensens blocked the ditch.
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in the ditch caused additional flooding of the Roberts property than would occur without the fill.
As this is the precise issue which Dr. Brockway addressed, the court improperly excluded his
expert opinion and failed to properly analyze the same pursuant to I.R.E. 702 and applicable law.
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed proper and improper district court
findings concerning speculative expert testimony. Expert opinion testimony can be speculative if
it lacks “a necessary factual foundation” which would merely invite conjecture. Bromley v.
Garey, 132 Idaho at 815, 979 P.2d at 1173. In Bromley, the Court found that an expert who gave
an opinion on mechanical possibilities yet who had not actually examined the mechanism nor
offered an opinion as to which possibility was more probable, to be speculative and unhelpful to
the jury. See id.
Testimony may also be speculative if it theorizes “about a matter as to which evidence is
not sufficient for certain knowledge.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1255 (5th ed. 1979); Karlson v.
Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004). In Karlson, the Court addressed the
question of whether expert testimony based upon hypothetical questions becomes speculative
and unhelpful to the finder of fact. See id. at 567. The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that so
long as the theory underlying an expert’s testimony is based upon evidence made known to that
expert, it will not be found speculative for reason of lacking sufficient knowledge. See id.
In the same vein, an opinion which suggests only possibilities may be properly excluded
because that opinion would not assist the trier of fact. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 538, 348
P.3d 145, 153 (2015). In Adams, the expert could not point to where an alleged error occurred in
the opposing expert’s calculations, but only opined that “an error did occur.” Id. The district
court concluded, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the expert’s opinions were conclusory
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and speculative, noting that such testimony would have been of no assistance to the trier of fact
regarding whether an error in calculation had actually occurred. See id.
There is little relationship between the holdings in Bromley, Karlson, or Adams and the
district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Brockway’s expert report in this case. Dr. Brockway
relied upon and provided site specific evidence regarding the effect of filling in the ditch and
opined upon the same. R. 535-43. He relied upon an actual land survey of the property to
analyze the flow path of drainage water. R. 536, 544-558. If anything, these cases contradict
and expose the district court’s error in excluding Dr. Brockway’s testimony.
Perhaps most instructive to the district court’s flawed rationale in this case is Weeks v. E.
Idaho Health Servs. 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007). The underlying issue in Weeks that
the expert testified to was whether a nurse’s action of administering an infusion to a woman’s
brain was the cause of that woman’s death. See id. The expert testified that the infusion was a
substantial factor in causing the death to a reasonable medical probability, but he was unable to
determine the exact effect of the medication on woman’s brain. See id. at 839. The trial court
excluded the expert’s testimony finding it inadmissible to prove causation because no research
had been done upon that exact type of occurrence and the precise effect that such an infusion
would have on the brain. See id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the expert had been
clear that the infusion would cause a deleterious effect regardless of other factors, and thus the
testimony should not have been excluded. See id.
Here, the factual circumstances of expert testimony parallel those presented in Weeks.
The district court concluded that, because other factors of water flow and the culvert condition
had not been opined upon, Dr. Brockway’s testimony should be excluded wholesale. However,
similar to the expert in Weeks, Dr. Brockway was able to assert with scientific certainty that the
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Jensens’ filling in of the ditch to a point three (3) feet higher than the culvert outlet would cause
a deleterious effect on the Roberts’ property regardless of other factors. R. 541-42. Further, the
exact amount of the increased flooding did not need to be ascertained on summary judgment to
determine whether the Jensens violated Roberts’ natural servitude by increasing the flooding on
Roberts’ property - which was the central question in this case. If the Jensens’ fill caused
additional flooding, no matter how great or small, it would have the effect of violating Roberts’
right to drain surface water from her property. Dr. Brockway’s analysis was focused on that
central question and he provided an opinion on the specific effect of the Jensens’ actions:
Without the fill, routine drainage flows less than about 1 cfs could be passed
through the culverts without overtopping the road. With the fill in its existing
condition, both small and routine drainage flows as well as larger runoff events
will back up and inundate the road and the Roberts property.
R. 543.
Dr. Brockway’s opinion was supported by substantial data and a land survey. R. 538-543;
544-558. Thus, Dr. Brockway’s analysis was relevant, competent, and based upon valid
scientific analysis that should not have been excluded by the district court. Additionally,
contrary to the district court’s rationale of culvert flow, the exact amount of increased flooding
caused by the Jensens actions is irrelevant to Roberts’ requested relief. Importantly, Roberts
requested an injunction to require the Jensens to restore the condition of the natural servitude – a
request which could and should be granted upon the finding of any increased flooding. R. 391.
For the foregoing reasons, Roberts respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district
court’s decision excluding Dr. Brockway’s testimony. Further, the Court should reverse the
summary judgment order and remand the case for further consideration.
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III.

The Court Erroneously Dismissed Roberts’ Nuisance Claim as Matter of Law.
Ignoring the natural servitude between the properties the district court dismissed Roberts’

nuisance claim as a matter of law solely on the basis of its interpretation related to section 421207, Idaho Code. R. 721. The district court reasoned that the issue was only whether the
Jensens were “negligent” by filling in the ditch and that the statute did not give rise to a claim of
nuisance. See id. The court’s limited analysis of the nuisance claim is erroneous and contrary to
controlling precedent set forth in Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 304 P.2d, 1104 (1956).
Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand for further proceedings.
First, the court erred in analyzing Roberts’ claim as solely related to an interest in the
ditch easement. Although Roberts pled a violation of section 42-1207, the statute was not the
sole basis of her nuisance claim. 8 As such, this Court should reverse.
Roberts claimed the following with respect to a private nuisance caused by the Jensens:
24. The Jensens’ placement of fill in the ditch and within the natural
servitude has impeded the flow of water therein which has led to the damages
claimed by Roberts.
25. The Jensens’ continuing obstruction to the free use of the Roberts
Property has created a private nuisance, and Roberts is entitled to an injunction
enjoining or abating the continued blockage of the waste ditch and/or the natural
servitude on the Jensen Property which impedes the discharge of natural flows
across the Jensen Property, together with an order compelling the Jensens to
restore the ditch to its previous condition.
R. 390 (emphasis added).
Clearly Roberts alleged a nuisance claim on the basis of the established natural servitude,
not just through a statutory easement theory. Further, the court made several erroneous factual

8
Roberts is no longer pursuing a statutory claim in the waste ditch as an easement under section 42-1207. Roberts
does not dispute that the ditch upstream of the Jensen property was abandoned by Roberts’ predecessors and others.
Despite waiving the statutory easement claim, Roberts still maintains that the Jensens had no right to modify the
existence of the ditch on their property. Such an action interfered with the established natural servitude and historic
drainage of water off the Roberts property that occurred through the ditch, specifically from at least 2001 to 2013.
The natural servitude included the existing ditch as a feature of the land where water drained.
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findings in ignoring the natural servitude and limiting its analysis to the application of section
42-1207 to Roberts’ nuisance claim. Notably, the court ignored the record in finding:
The purpose of the ditch was the conveyance of “waste water” which has a
defined meaning which does not include general surface water from snow melt or
rain fall.
***
It is clear that the ditch was never intended to convey surface water generated
from rainfall or snowmelt.
R. 710.
Regardless of the original intent and use of the ditch, the facts are undisputed that the
ditch actually drained natural diffused surface water for decades. Several witnesses, including
the Jensens, testified to the function of the ditch on their property until it was wrongfully covered
in 2013. R. 41, 49, 65, 408. Stated another way, the natural servitude encompassed the ditch as
it existed pre-2013. The scope of the servitude included the ditch since water flowed to and
through this feature on the Jensens’ property for decades, importantly at least from 2001 until
2013. Therefore, the court’s limited review of the nuisance claim in the context of an active
statutory ditch easement fails. Since a natural servitude existed through the Jensen property,
including through the ditch as it existed when they purchased their property, the Jensens had no
right to fill it and block the flow of surface water from an area of 282 acres, including the
Roberts property. R. 538, see also, Ex. B.
Assuming this Court finds an existing natural servitude, Roberts is entitled to pursue her
nuisance claim. Idaho law defines a nuisance as follows:
Anything which is injurious to health or morals, or is indecent, or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake,
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or river, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a
nuisance.
I.C. § 52-101 (emphasis added).
Every nuisance not defined as a public nuisance or a moral nuisance, is
private.
I.C. § 52-107.
First, Roberts pled and provided sufficient facts to show that the Jensens both: 1)
obstructed the free use of her property; and 2) obstructed the free passage or use of the local
basin. See Ex. B. The district court wholly ignored the same and went even further by
erroneously striking the expert opinion of Dr. Brockway that was relevant to this issue. R. 703,
709-12; see Argument Part II. Evidence was submitted that showed the Jensens actions in 2013
obstructed the flow of surface water through their property. R. 156, 695. Consequently, the
flooding event in 2017 caused damage to Roberts’ home, corrals, and barn. R. 41, 54-63. Dr.
Brockway opined on the effects of the Jensens’ actions and showed how the surface water level
on Roberts’ property was raised in relation to the filling of the ditch. R. 541-42. The Jensens’
filling of the ditch obstructed both the “free use” of Roberts’ property and “the free passage or
use” of the local basin contrary to section 52-101. 9
Further, Idaho law prohibits such private nuisances as found in Langley v. Deshazer, 78
Idaho 376, 378-380, 304 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (1956), a case directly on point to the facts here. 10

9

At a minimum there are disputed genuine issues of material fact on this question that prevented summary
judgment. Even the Jensens agreed on this point before the district court. R. 612 (“there are genuine issues of
material fact if the Jensen’ act(s) caused Roberts’ alleged damage.”).

10

The district court erroneously refused to recognize the holding in Langley on the theory that the culvert in that
case could handle all the water, unlike the facts here. R. 711. To the contrary, the trial court in Langley ordered the
defendants to abate the nuisance “by installing a 24-inch culvert under their roadway,” as opposed to the prior “10inch culvert.” 78 Idaho at 378-79, 304 P.2d at 1105. Further, the district court here erroneously found that the water
in Langley originated from the defendant’s property. R. 711. Again, the court misread the facts as the water in
Langley originated in a natural drain that flowed through the plaintiffs’ property to a point where it was wrongly
dammed on defendant’s property at their private driveway. See Langley, 78 Idaho at 1104-05, 304 P.2d at 1104-05.
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See also, Smith, 105 Idaho at 646, 671 P.2d at 1109 (“An invasion of surface water on one’s
land, caused by the alteration of the natural flow on another’s land, may constitute a form of
nuisance.”).
In Langley, the lower landowner constructed a driveway that obstructed the flow of water
down a natural drain. See 78 Idaho at 378, 304 P.2d at 1105. The water backed up the drain and
damaged the up-gradient plaintiffs’ property. See id. The district court rejected the defendants’
prescriptive easement claim for the right to back up the water on the plaintiff’s property and
required the defendants’ to abate the nuisance. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. See
78 Idaho at 380, 304 P.2d at 1106. Since the district court wrongly limited its analysis of
Roberts’ nuisance claim to section 42-1207 and did not evaluate it in the context of her natural
servitude claim, the court erred as a matter of law. This Court should reverse and remand
accordingly.
IV.

The District Court Erroneously Dismissed Roberts’ Trespass Claim.
Similar to the nuisance claim, the district court ignored the existing natural servitude as a

basis to dismiss Roberts’ trespass claim. R. 709. The court reasoned that since the Jensens did
not cause an “intrusion or invasion” on Roberts’ property, there could be no trespass. As
explained below, the court erred in concluding that the Jensens did not cause water to intrude
upon Roberts’ property. See id. Consequently, the Court should reverse the dismissal of the
trespass claim and remand for further proceedings.
Idaho recognizes the common law tort of trespass. See Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208,
212, 345 P.3d 998, 1002 (2015). The elements of trespass are as follows: “1) an invasion 2)

The fact the defendants pumped out of a pond created by the backed up drain did not change the fact the water
originally flowed from the plaintiffs’ property. The district court’s attempt to distinguish Langley should be
reversed.
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which interferes with the right of exclusive possession of the land, and 3) which is a direct result
of some act committed by the defendant.” See Mock v. Potlatch Corporation, 786 F.Supp.
1545,1548 (D. Idaho 1992). Causing some tangible thing, like water, to intrude upon the land
satisfies the element of entry onto the land that interferes with exclusive possession. See id.;
Mueller, 158 Idaho at 213, 345 P.3d at 1003 (“causing increased water runoff onto it while Mr.
Mueller was in possession of it under a claim of right constituted a trespass quare clausum fregit
because it was an injury to his possession of the land.”) (emphasis added).
The district court erred in its review of the facts by wrongly concluding the Jensens did
not cause water to intrude upon the Roberts’ property. 11 R. 709. While it is true surface water
previously drained through the Roberts property, both over and under Sunnyside Drive, the water
nonetheless continued through the Jensens’ property pursuant a natural servitude. R. 41, 49, 65,
408. Water flowed through a specific area of the Roberts’ property when it was not impeded by
the filled in waste ditch. When the Jensens filled in the ditch in 2013, that action caused
increased flooding to intrude upon the Roberts property in areas never seen before. R. 12, 41-42,
58, 60, 62, 541-42.
Like the facts in Mueller, the increased flooding of Roberts’ barn, corrals, and crawl
space in her home constitutes an actionable trespass. The fact the water did not originate on the
Jensens’ property does not excuse their action which caused injury to Roberts’ possession of her
land. See Mueller, 158 Idaho at 213, 345 P.3d at 1003 (“He also contended that the increased
water runoff caused by the construction of the driveway killed part of his crop. . . . Thus, Mr.
Mueller claimed a traceable connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct .
. . . The district court did not err in holding that he had standing to bring his trespass claim.”).

11

Similar to the nuisance claim, the Jensens admitted there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the
trespass claim. R. 612.
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Moreover, the facts in Johnson v. Twin Falls Canal Co. provide a similar analogy to the
facts here. In Johnson, the Snake River ran by the respondent’s property, it did not originate on
the alleged trespasser’s (Twin Falls Canal Co.) property. See 66 Idaho 660, 664, 167 P.2d 834,
835 (1946). The respondent alleged the downstream dam’s operations trespassed by increasing
the water level thus eroding and washing away his property. See id. The Supreme Court agreed
and held: “Injunction lies to restrain the repetitions of a trespass, especially where, as here, the
injury would be irreparable . . . In the instant case there is no doubt there is, and has been, a
continuous, recurring trespass; that the damage done and being done to the land is irreparable
and, if continued, respondents’ farm land may become non-existent.” 66 Idaho at 675-676.
Further, consistent with the law applicable to navigable and non-navigable watercourses,
this Court should find that interference with a natural servitude is actionable in trespass where
that interference causes water to invade the adjoining landowner’s property. See e.g. Campion v.
Simpson, 104 Idaho 413, 415-16, 659 P.2d 766, 769-70 (1983) (“the filling of channels 1 and 2
by Simpson constitute a public nuisance and trespass in the channel of the Wood River.”);
Johnson, 66 Idaho at 675, 167 P.2d at 841 (enjoining trespass of flooding caused by increased
water level of the lake that over-flowed additional lands by eroding and washing away
respondent’s land); Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 478, 406 P.2d 113, 117 (1965)
(“A riparian owner, however, has no right to place obstruction into the stream for the purpose of
changing the natural channel of the stream, or for any other purpose, that would do damage to
the riparian owner on the opposite or to the owners of land abutting upon the stream either above
or below.”) (emphasis added); Scott v. Watkins, 63 Idaho 506, 122 P.2d 220 (1942); Fischer v.
Davis, 19 Idaho 493, 116 P. 412 (1911). The same reasoning should apply to natural servitudes
given the “civil rule” law that is followed in Idaho.
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Again, the district court’s narrow view of the facts and applicable law constitutes
reversible error. Just as landowners along a stream cannot impede the flow in a manner to injure
their neighbors so too this premise should be extended and apply to those subject to a natural
servitude. Since the Jensens caused additional flooding of the Roberts’ property to her damage,
that action constitutes an actionable trespass. The court wrongly dismissed Roberts’ trespass
claim on summary judgment. Roberts respectfully requests this Court to reverse.
V.

The District Court Erred in Granting Jensens’ Summary Judgment Motion and
Should Not Have Dismissed Roberts’ Complaint With Prejudice.
As explained above, the district court erroneously granted summary judgment for the

Jensens on the natural servitude issue without properly considering the facts and the relevant
expert testimony offered by Roberts. The Jensens’ interference with the natural servitude and
liability for those actions resulted in justiciable claims that Roberts was entitled to pursue under
both valid nuisance and trespass theories. See Jones v. State, 85 Idaho 135, 147, 376 P.2d 361,
368 (1962) (summary judgment decision erroneous where unresolved questions of fact existed).
As such, the district court’s erroneous and limited analysis did not meet the Rule 56 standard of
review.
As a result, the court should not have dismissed Roberts’ complaint with prejudice but
should have allowed those claims to proceed to trial. Roberts respectfully requests this Court to
reverse those decisions and remand for additional proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
CONCLUSION
The law of natural servitude is well settled in Idaho. Lower landowners are prohibited
from interfering with the drainage of surface water from higher ground. The law is just and
provides certainty to property owners throughout the state. The district court’s decision turns
that well-settled rule on its head by placing Roberts’ property in a legal vacuum with no remedy
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for natural flooding. Although surface water had drained to and through the Jensen property for
decades, the court erroneously ignored this fact as well as the consequences of the actions taken
by the Jensens in 2013. The district court’s error must be corrected.
Further, the district court wrongly excluded relevant expert testimony analyzing the
issues in this case. Whereas Dr. Brockway provided relevant scientific evidence concerning
hydrology, drainage, and the impacts of the Jensens’ actions in filling in the ditch, the court had
no rational basis to exclude such testimony. Pursuant to I.R.E. 702 and prior precedent, the
district court clearly abused its discretion.
In sum, Roberts respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
DATED this 28th day of May, 2019.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
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